

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 00002 01 OF 02 102336 Z

72

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

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FM USDEL SALT TWO II

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1848

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0002

EXDIS SALT

E. O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: OPENING PLENARY STATEMENT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

1. FYI FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT I PROPOSE TO MAKE AT FIRST FORMAL MEETING WITH SOVDEL. AS IT IS ENTIRELY WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF NSDM 197 AND STATEMENTS MADE BY USDEL AT SALT TWO- I, I DO NOT CONSIDER IT REQUIRES WASHINGTON CLEARANCE. HOWEVER, I WOULD BE PLEASED TO HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS THAT WASHINGTON AGENCIES MAY HAVE.

2. QUOTE WE BEGIN TODAY THE NINTH SESSION OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS AND THE SECOND SESSION OF THIS SECOND PHASE. AT THE OUTSET, I SHOULD LIKE TO INTRODUCE THE MEMBERS OF THE U. S. DELEGATION. MR. NITZE AND DR. BROWN (WHO WILL BE JOINING US TOMORROW) BY NOW SEEM, I AM SURE, LIKE OLD ACQUAINTANCES TO YOU. WE ARE HAPPY TO HAVE LT. GENERAL EDWARD ROWNY JOIN US AS THE SENIOR MILITARY MEMBER ON THE U. S. DELEGATION. MR. KLOSSON OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS ALSO A NEW MEMBER OF THE U. S. TEAM. DURING THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, I BELIEVE MR. KLOSSON MAY HAVE BEEN PRIVILEGED TO SPEND MORE TIME IN MOSCOW THAN MOST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION. LAST, BUT NOT LEAST, MR. GRAYBEEAL, WHO IS A FAMILIAR FACE TO YOU IS NOW A FULL MEMBER OF THE U. S. DELEGATION.

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SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00002 01 OF 02 102336 Z

3. THOSE OF US WHO ARE NEW WILL NO DOUBT RELY HEAVILY UPON THE EXPERTISE AND LONG EXPERIENCE OF THE VETERANS OF THIS HISTORIC UNDERTAKING. WE LOOK FORWARD TO A PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET DELEGATION AS WE PUSH FORWARD OUR EFFORTS TO ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF BOTH OUR COUNTRIES AND OF THE ENTIRE WORLD.

4. THIS IS AN APPROPRIATE OCCASION TO CONSIDER WHERE WE STAND AND WHAT WE TOGETHER ARE ATTEMPTING TO ACCOMPLISH.

5. THE BRIEF PRELIMINARY SESSION WHICH TOOK PLACE DURING NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER OF LAST YEAR, IN ADDITION TO PREPARING THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ESTABLISHING THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, WAS INTENDED TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR A MORE SYSTEMATIC NEGOTIATION THIS YEAR. THIS EFFORT INCLUDED A USEFUL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS AND DISCUSSION OF A DRAFT PROGRAM OF WORK. WE HAVE CAREFULLY REVIEWED THESE EXCHANGES. THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE AS THEIR GOAL THE WORKING OUT OF A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO REPLACE THE INTERIM AGREEMENT -- ONE WHICH WILL PARALLEL THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE ABM TREATY TO STRATEGIC STABILITY WITH NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE TO EITHER SIDE. THE VERY TITLE OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT MAKES CLEAR THAT IT IS A TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENT. BOTH SIDES AGREED IT IS TO REMAIN IN FORCE FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS " UNLESS (BEGIN UNDERLINE) REPLACED (END UNDERLINE) EARLIER BY AN AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS." IT IS CLEAR THAT THE PROBLEMS WE FACE ARE COMPLEX AND THAT THE APPROACHES OF OUR TWO SIDES TO SOLVING THESE PROBLEMS ARE NOT IDENTICAL. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS MOST IMPORTANT TO KEEP THE LONG- TERM OBJECTIVES OF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT FOREMOST IN OUR MINDS AS WE SEEK MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SOLUTIONS TO THESE PROBLEMS.

6. THE U. S. SIDE BELIEVES THAT AGREEING ON MEASURES WHICH WILL CONTRIBUTE TO MAINTAINING AND IMPROVING STRATEGIC STABILITY WITH NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE TO EITHER SIDE IS A MATTER OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE IN OUR TASK. AS SALT ONE OPENED IN HELSINKI, THE U. S. NOTED THAT A PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF BOTH SIDES AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY. TO THAT END, THE U. S. EXPRESSED CERTAIN AIMS REGARDING STRATEGIC STABILITY. -- WE SAID THAT WE HOPE TO ACHIEVE AND MAINTAIN A STABLE U. S.-
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PAGE 03 SALT T 00002 01 OF 02 102336 Z

SOVIET STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WHICH WOULD MINIMIZE THE DANGER

OF THE OUTBREAK OF A NUCLEAR WAR.

-- WE STATED OUR BELIEF THAT AGREED LIMITATIONS ON OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS CAN BE REACHED WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO THE MAINTENANCE OF A STABLE U. S.- SOVIET STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AND ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF BOTH COUNTRIES AND OF THE ENTIRE WORLD.

7. AN AGREEMENT WHICH ENHANCES THE SURVIVABILITY AND THE PENETRATION CAPABILITY OF STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES OVER THE LONG- TERM WOULD REDUCE PERCEPTIONS BY EITHER SIDE OF THE NECES- SITY, OTHER THAN FOR MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT PURPOSES, FOR UNDERTAKING MAJOR NEW ARMS PROGRAMS TO AVOID BEING PLACED AT A STRATEGIC DISADVANTAGE. CONFIDENCE IN THE ENDURING SURVIVABILITY AND PENETRATION CAPABILITY OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS IS AN ESSENTIAL FEATURE OF DETERRENCE, AND THUS OF A STABLE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP.

8. EARLY IN THE LAST SESSION, THE U. S. DELEGATION PUT FORWARD THREE QUESTIONS WHICH WE BELIEVE ARE THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS WHOSE ANSWERS WILL SHAPE THE AGREEMENT WE ARE WORKING OUT.

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PAGE 01 SALT T 00002 02 OF 02 102337 Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

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O 102205 Z MAR 73

FM USDEL SALT TWO II

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1849

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0002

EXDIS SALT

E. O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: OPENING PLENARY STATEMENT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

AS YOU MAY RECALL, THESE QUESTIONS WERE AS FOLLOWS: WHICH

SYSTEMS SHOULD BE LIMITED? HOW ARE THEY TO BE LIMITED? TO WHAT LEVEL SHOULD THEY BE LIMITED? WE TRUST THAT POINTS OF CONTACT WILL BEGIN TO EMERGE DURING THIS SESSION AS WE STRIVE TO ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS IN WAYS WHICH WILL ENHANCE STRATEGIC STABILITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE TO EITHER SIDE.

9. THE U. S. SIDE CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE THAT ANY STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT MUST EMBODY IS AN EQUAL AGGREGATE LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS. THESE ARE THE SYSTEMS WHICH PLAY THE CENTRAL ROLE IN THE STRATEGIC BALANCE AND WHICH PROVIDE THE DETERRENCE UPON WHICH THE STABILITY OF THAT BALANCE DEPENDS. WE BELIEVE THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE AN INTEREST IN NEGOTIATING APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS FOR SUBSTITUTION OF UNITS OF ONE KIND FOR UNITS OF ANOTHER KIND WITHIN THIS AGGREGATE. IN ADDITION, WE BELIEVE THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN EQUAL SUB- CEILING ON THE NUMBER OF ICBM LAUNCHERS.

10. IN VIEW OF THE PERMANENT NATURE OF A NEW AGREEMENT, WE
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PAGE 02 SALT T 00002 02 OF 02 102337 Z

ALSO BELIEVE THAT IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVE OF ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE THERE SHOULD BE AN EQUAL OVERALL CEILING ON THE THROW- WEIGHT OF EACH SIDE' S ICBM FORCES. SUCH A CEILING WOULD LIMIT THE POTENTIAL THREAT TO THE DETERRENT FORCE OF THE OTHER SIDE, AND WOULD THUS CONTRIBUTE TO STRATEGIC STABILITY.

11. ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE COULD THEORETICALLY BE ACHIEVED AT A NUMBER OF LEVELS. THE U. S. SIDE BELIEVES THAT A PROGRAM OF MUTUAL REDUCTIONS IS THE PREFERRED APPROACH. ARGUMENTS COULD BE MADE ON STRATEGIC, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC GROUNDS WHY NOW IS AN OPPORTUNE TIME TO BEGIN TO REVERSE THE LONG BUILDUP OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE HAVE NOTED THE REMARKS OF GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV ON DECEMBER 21, 1972.

12. THERE MAY BE VARIOUS APPROACHES TO OUR CURRENT TASK, BUT WHATEVER APPROACH THAT IS PURSUED MUST RESULT IN ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE. THE ABM TREATY IS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO STRATEGIC STABILITY, BUT IT MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY A PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC ARMS. THE ABM TREATY COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED UNTIL THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY HAD BEEN MET TO THE SATISFACTION OF BOTH SIDES; THERE CANNOT BE ONE STANDARD FOR THE ABM TREATY AND ANOTHER FOR A PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON OFFENSIVE ARMS. ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE MUST BE ACHIEVED IN THIS AREA AS WELL.

13. MR. MINISTER, I HAVE OUTLINED THE GENERAL APPROACH OF THE

U. S. SIDE TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS.
WE WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THIS APPROACH IN GREATER
DETAIL IN THE COMING WEEKS.

14. WE LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING THE VIEWS OF THE SOVIET DELEGA-
TION ON THE MATTERS WE HAVE RAISED TODAY.

15. GIVEN THE DETERMINATION AND THE SPIRIT WHICH PRODUCED THE
ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, THE U. S. DELEGATION
SEES NO OBSTACLE WHICH IS INSURMOUNTABLE AS WE MOVE TOWARD
PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. UNQUOTE
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